The Four Traditional Roles of a Central Bank
Ever since Keynes, central banks have played four traditional roles: Each such suggestion needs to be confronted with the question posed in the previous paragraph: Would it lead to better policy decisions?
It is hard to dispute Patman's proposition in the abstract. Who, writing on a blank slate today, would design such a structure? In fact, the best (only) defense of the FOMC's odd power structure may be to claim-with some justificationthat it has worked well for 75 years. So why change it now?
Asset Bubbles and Monetary Policy
The next question is whether bursting, or even "leaning against," asset-price bubbles should be an integral part of monetary policy. Or should the Federal Reserve eschew second-guessing market valuations and content itself with "mopping up" after bubbles burst? I will call the latter the Greenspan-Bernanke approach, since the last two Fed chairmen have embraced it. 17 But truth-in-writing demands that I confess to have advocated the "mop-up-after" approach, too.
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This is not the place for a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of bubble bursting; I have offered that elsewhere Ricardo Reis 2005, Blinder 2006, 16 that are too big to be allowed to fail messily. Other, much smaller firms can pose systemic risks only if many of them act in the same way at the same time.
But that focus seems far too narrow, not to mention too formulaic. 20 Finally, some firms are so intertwined with others that their failure could pose systemic risks out of proportion to their size.
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The recent financial disruptions laid bare a major regulatory lacuna: the absence of a single agency responsible for preserving financial stability--the so-called systemic risk regulator (SRR). One possible reaction to this claim is: "Wait a minute. Isn't the Fed already the systemic risk regulator in the U.S.?" My answer to this question is: almost, but not quite. Yes, the Fed is the SRR, but only tacitly, not explicitly. In consequence, it
One case in point is firms that are essential to the payment and settlement system. For example, NYSE Euronext is not a very large firm, but its disorderly failure would be intolerable.
probably lacks some of the tools and powers it needs to do the job properly-not to mention the mission focus and the explicit responsibility.
In my view, the Fed should be made the (explicit) SRR for a variety of reasons. The first is a straightforward argument based on economies of scope. Figure 1 depicts a regulatory continuum ranging from the most "macro" function, monetary policy, on the left, to the most "micro" function, the prudential supervision of small banks, on the right.
In between come two intermediate functions: preserving financial stability (which is often called "macro-prudential"), and the "micro-prudential" supervision of large institutions, especially the SIFIs. To me, such a separation of functions ignores obvious and probably strong economies of scope.
Financial stability is so closely related to the standard goals of monetary policy (stabilizing output and inflation) that it is "a proper incident thereto." It therefore seems somewhere between foolish and impossible to separate the two functions.
Furthermore, the pursuit of financial stability will often involve using lender-of-lastresort powers. For these reasons, central banks all over the world (including the U.S.)
have naturally assumed responsibility for financial stability, albeit not always with great success. 23 Finally, accountability seems to demand a single agency that can be held responsible for financial stability, not a committee--which would allow each member to point the finger of guilt at the others.
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Does it make sense to draw the line at point 2, separating financial stability, which is "macro-prudential," from the supervision of large SIFIs, which is generally called "micro-prudential?" I think not, and for a simple reason: It is mainly the actions and balance sheets of SIFIs that can, and occasionally do, imperil financial stability. And when things go awry, changes in the SIFIs' balance sheets, managements, riskmanagement systems, and the like will almost certainly be major elements of the cure.
Indeed, this proposition comes close to being tautological. It is difficult to imagine systemic risk arising if every SIFI is operating safely and soundly. Conversely, the failure or near-failure of even a single SIFI might be enough to trigger a systemic crisis. Finally, because SIFIs are large, highly visible, and politically connected, we want their regulator to be fiercely independent of politics. Each of these considerations points straight to the In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, … to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank.
In short, it says that, in an emergency, the Fed can lend to anyone and is the sole judge of whether the collateral is good.
In a system of government founded on checks and balances, Section 13.3 is a remarkable, perhaps even breathtaking, grant of authority-especially since the powers are granted to unelected officials. It seems to me that 13.3 should be amended to require two things: sign-off by the Secretary of the Treasury, acting as the President's agent; and prompt reporting and explanation to the banking committees of both houses of Congress, probably under a confidentiality restriction for a period of time.
Bank Supervision and Regulation
Should the central bank also be a bank supervisor and regulator, or should those tasks be assigned to a separate agency, as is done in the U. But what about the conflict-of-interest issue? It is not difficult to imagine banking institutions-large and small-getting into trouble, and therefore meriting supervisory discipline, at a time when the macroeconomy is weak. If the central bank were also the safety and soundness supervisor, it would find itself pulled in two conflicting directions.
Its supervisory role would tell it to discipline the wayward banks, which might well reduce overall bank lending. But its monetary policy role would suggest regulatory forbearance because the economy needs more lending. The result could easily be lax supervision just when banks are least safe and sound.
Or so the argument goes. But is it correct? Consider what might happen when supervisory authority and monetary policy are placed in different hands. In that case, the independent bank supervisor would be unlikely to take macroeconomic considerations into account. So it might crack down hard on the banks, thus limiting lending, just when the economy needs more credit. Maybe that's not the outcome society wants.
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27 For example, both in 1990-1992 and now, many critics have claimed that over-zealous regulators were/are limiting bank lending when it was/is most needed.
Maybe it is more appropriate for supervisory discipline to be tempered by macroeconomic concerns. That is certainly the philosophy behind the Bank of Spain's heavily praised system of "dynamic provisioning" for loan losses and behind current efforts to make Finally, notice that making the Fed both the systemic risk regulator and the supervisor of SIFIs would make the central bank a larger and more powerful institution.
Yet some people have argued, with some cogency, that the Fed has too much unchecked power already. My approach to this conundrum was mentioned earlier: We can take away the Fed's responsibilities for consumer protection, for supervising small banks, and for enforcing the CRA. Those three changes would reduce the Fed's range, influence, and certainly its headcount.
Summing Up
It is not just uncontroversial, but probably banal, to assert that the central bank is and should be the country's only lender of last resort and its sole (and independent) monetary policy authority. What seems to have been less noticed is that several related job assignments follow logically from that assertion. Most important, the central bank should be the systemic risk regulator because preserving financial stability is (a) closely aligned with the objectives of monetary policy and (b) likely to require LOLR powers.
Conversely, however, some of the other roles the Federal Reserve has acquired over the years-such as in consumer protection, CRA, and the supervision of certain small banks-are, at best, peripheral to its core mission and, at worst, "weak sisters" whose status within the central bank will always be dwarfed by monetary policy. Certainly these tasks do not require much in the way of LOLR powers. A rationalization of duties along the lines suggested here would probably leave the Fed a smaller but more focused agency.
Two main arguments have been raised against this realignment of duties. The most telling argument seems to be the potential conflict-of-interest problem just discussed:
Safety and soundness considerations might sometime collide with monetary policy.
While valid, that objection can easily be stood on its head: The central bank is probably best-positioned to balance the two competing objectives, rather than leaving them in the hands of two independent agencies. After all, we do not drive motor vehicles by assigning one person to the gas pedal and another to the brakes.
The other argument is political: Some people do not want the Fed to supervise SIFIs and/or serve as the systemic risk regulator because either role would push the central bank deeper into the realm of politics-which could, as a consequence, politicize monetary policy. There is a kernel of truth here. After all, systemic risk regulation will on occasion involve life-or-death decisions on specific, prominent, and politically-connected companies. With billions, if not trillions, of dollars at stake, such decisions will attract politicians like bees to honey.
My response to this argument is to grant the premise-yes, we want such decisions to be as apolitical as possible-but then to remember the classic Henny Youngman 
